Monetary policy transmission mechanisms and currency unions A vector error correction approach to a Trans-Tasman currency union by Alfred A. Haug et al.
Monetary policy transmission  
mechanisms and currency unions: 
A vector error correction approach to a 




Alfred A Haug, Özer Karagedikli 










Differences in transmission mechanisms can generate asymmetric behaviour among 
currency union partners when they experience shocks.  This has the potential to widen 
existing cyclical variation between members of a currency union.  Our analysis 
suggests that the transmission mechanisms of GDP and the CPI of a  monetary shock 
appear to be similar in Australia and New Zealand.  However, there are differences in 
terms of the size of the responses of some variables to identical monetary policy 
shocks.  In a currency union with a different exchange rate pattern and  with different 
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 1  Introduction 
An important concern in the formation of currency unions is the nature of monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms in the prospective member countries.  Monetary 
policy affects macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and inflation, through monetary 
transmission channels.  An examination of transmission mechanisms allows us to 
consider the responsiveness of economic variables to policy shocks (the size of the 
effect) and how the speed of adjustment varies between different countries (the speed 
of the effect).  This issue is receiving attention in Europe, reflecting the concern that 
differences in transmission mechanisms across Euro countries could widen the 
existing cyclical variation and potentially impede the inflation-targeting role of the 
European Central Bank (ECB).
1 
 
The results of studies on Euro-area transmission mechanisms vary considerably.  
Gerlach and Smets (1995) concluded that the effects of monetary policy shocks were 
not very different across EU countries.  However, they found the effects to be larger 
in Germany than in other major EU countries.  Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) 
found the effects of the short term interest rates on output to be about twice as high in 
Italy and about three times as large in Spain (after controlling for fluctuations in the 
intra-EU area exchange rate) compared to the other countries.  Ramaswamy and Sloek 
(1998) looked at the speed of adjustment to an unanticipated contraction in monetary 
policy.  They found that the full effect of a policy shock on output took twice as long 
in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands and was twice as deep in 
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, compared to the other countries.  There is still much 
debate on this issue. 
 
In this  paper we examine the similarity of transmission mechanisms in New Zealand 
and Australia and consider the implications this has for a currency union between the 
two economies. A major concern with the formation of a currency union is how a 
single monetary policy will affect the member countries and whether it would affect 
all members equally.  The answer to this question cannot be known until monetary 
union is actually implemented.  We can, however, gain some insight into this issue by 
examining the effect o f monetary policy changes in the past.  The Lucas (1976) 
critique suggests that differences in the transmission mechanisms that exist prior to 
currency union may not continue to exist following unification.  However, examining 
transmission mechanisms in this way may still highlight important concerns with 
potential currency union partners.  
 
We first estimate empirical models of both the New Zealand and Australian 
economies.  We then compare the transmission mechanisms of the two economies.  
This is accomplished using Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs).  Standard 
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) that do not impose error-corrections for deviations 
from the long run equilibrium of the model are a very commonly used methodology in 
this field.   Monetary transmission mechanisms based on VECMs were studied by 
King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991), Ehrmann (1998), Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and 
Shin (2001), and Camarero et al (2002), among others.  In part, our examination aims 
                                          
1 See Clements, Kontolemis and Levy 2001.   2 
to explore the suitability of this methodology for modelling economic activity in New 
Zealand. 
 
Our examination of transmission mechanisms tentatively suggests that they are quite 
similar for New Zealand and Australia.  In particular, when each economy faces an 
identical exogenous monetary policy shock, similar adjustments seem to occur to 
GDP and the CPI in the two economies.  By contrast, some differences may exist in 
the adjustment that occurs to the TWI in each country following a monetary policy 
shock.  However the size of the GDP response to a monetary policy shock appears to 
be larger in New Zealand than in Australia.  This suggests that a same size increase in 
interest rates to reduce union-wide inflation may cause a larger GDP effect in New 
Zealand.  
 
We note the conditional nature of our findings and that this is a major limitation of the 
work.  In particular, the findings are not robust to changes in the sample period or the 
variables examined.  Note further that important differences exist between the price 
indices examined from each economy.  This complicates a comparison of how 
monetary policy in each economy is transmitted to the price level.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details our 
methodology and data.  Section 3 examines the transmission mechanisms of each 
economy when they operate independent monetary policies. The transmission 
mechanisms are estimated by VECMs.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2  Methodology and data 
 
We begin by defining a VECM for each country. Let 
i
t X  be the vector of endogenous 
variables for country i in period  t 
 
















t y  is real GDP, 
i
t p  is the price level, 
i
t R  is a short-term nominal interest rate, 
i
t e  is the Trade Weighted Index (TWI), and 
i
t c  is a variable that measures the use of 
private sector credit.  The reason for including these variables is to capture the main 
channels of transmission mechanisms, these being the exchange rate ch annel, interest 
rate channel and credit channel.  We limit our models to these three channels, and take 
a parsimonious approach when estimating our models, due to the limited number of 
observations available.  We also consider the inclusion of several exogenous variables, 
such as commodity price indices, the US GDP growth rate and the US short-term 
interest rate.  The inclusion of such variables aims to control for wider economic 
conditions in the economies we examine. 
 
We had difficulties with credit varia ble definitions and with their time series 
properties. Therefore, we tried instead different monetary aggregates.  M1 is highly 
correlated with private sector credit usage in both economies.  We have opted to use it 
as a proxy for private sector credit usage.  
   3 
We consider the transmission mechanisms in New Zealand and Australia individually 
and compare the responses of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks.  
This aims to highlight similarities and differences in the adjustment mechanisms of 
the two economies.  We then consider some implications of our findings for a 
hypothetical currency union between New Zealand and Australia. 
 
 
2.1  Econometric methodology  
 
In this section we will explain why we chose a VECM as our methodology and how 
we proceed in applying it.  Impulse response functions can be derived from two types 
of VARs.  One is a standard VAR with all variables specified in levels.  The other is a 
VECM that explicitly models variables integrated of order one [I(1)] and 
cointegrating rel ationships that are present in the data.  A VECM can be derived from 
a levels VAR by imposing cointegrating restrictions.  If a VAR is estimated in levels, 
without imposing cointegrating restrictions present in the data, VAR parameters are 
estimated consistently by least squares (Sims, Stock, and Watson 1990).  However, 
this method of estimating parameters is not efficient because information about 
cointegration (ie about the long run) is ignored in an unrestricted levels VAR.2  
VECM estimation instead will produce more precise and efficient parameter estimates.   
 
Deriving impulse response functions from either a levels VAR or a VECM 
specification requires a representation of the model in terms of shocks, which is a 
vector moving-average representation.  Impulse responses for the monetary 
transmissions mechanisms based on a levels VAR were studied by Sims (1992), 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), and 
Clements et al (2001), among others.  Impulse responses for monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms based on VECMs were explored by King et al  (1991), 
Ehrmann (1998), Lütkepohl and Wolters (1998), Cecchetti (1999), and Garratt et al 
(2001), among others.3 
 
In order to derive impulse responses, a set of identifying restrictions has to be 
imposed.  There are two approaches used to achieve identification of the shocks.  One 
is based on imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of shocks, the other 
is based on imposing long run restrictions on the effects of shocks.  To  impose 
contemporaneous restrictions, the standard approach is a Choleski decomposition of 
the residual covariance matrix from the VAR or VECM model, ie from the so -called 
reduced form model.  It imposes a contemporaneous recursive structure on the shocks 
that depends in a crucial way on the ordering of the variables in the system.  The 
ordering reflects the speed with which variables respond to shocks.  The triangular 
form used for the Choleski decomposition only imposes contemporaneous restrictions 
without any restrictions on the lagged structural parameters.
4  The literature on 
monetary transmissions has suggested several different orderings.  There is no 
agreement on the ordering because different economic theories imply different 
                                          
2 Peersman and Smets (2001) and some others follow this approach. 
 
3 Gerlach and Smets (1995) specified a model in first differences but did not account for cointegration. 
4 See also Pesaran and Shin (1998) for an alternative to Choleski decomposition.   4 
orderings.
5  Several potential variable orderings are considered in this paper.  The 
orderings examined reflect our priors regarding the operation of monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms based on economic theory. 
 
The second approach imposes long run restrictions in order to achieve identification 
of the shock structure.6  An example of a long run identifying assumption could be 
that nominal shocks have no effects on real output.  Let aijk measure the effect on real 
output of the i-th variable in a VAR at lag t-k for the j -th shock, which is a nominal 
shock.  If there are no long run effects of the j-th shock on real output, then the sum 
over all k from zero to infinity is zero.  King et al (1991) use the VECM model to 
impose long run restrictions implied by cointegrating vectors in order to achieve 
identification for the impulse response analysis.7  The arguments for imposing certain 
restrictions are usually based on economic theory, and depending on the theory, 
different long run restrictions have been proposed. 
 
Faust and Leeper (1997) pointed out situations for which long run restrictions that are 
imposed to identify impulse responses can give unreliable results.  In particular, they 
question the reliability of the estimates of the a ijk parameters. However, they 
suggested several possible solutions to assure more reliability, including the 
imposition of zero effects of shock after a specified time period.   
 
In this paper, we will not follow the approach of imposing binding long run 
restrictions in order to achieve identification of the shocks.  We will use instead 
restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of shocks, within a VECM model.  The 
cointegrating relationships in our model impose certain behaviour on the short run 
dynamics within the VECM framework and our interest lies with the effects of shocks 
in the short run.  In other words, we do not use infinite horizon restrictions on aijk to 
identify shocks. 
 
In VARs or VECMs, the impulse response coefficients are non-linear functions of the 
underlying parameters of the models. In addition the asymptotic theory for impulse 
response functions is different from that for VARs or VECMs.  Analytic results for 
confidence intervals are available for stationary VARs (percentile-t intervals).  
However, size distortions can be large in finite samples.  Kilian (1999) analysed the 
issue for stationary models.  For cointegrated systems, Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) 
derived asymptotic distributions for impulse responses in the case of only 
contemporaneous restrictions.  Vlaar (1998) extended these results to long run 
restrictions.  The performance of asymptotic confidence intervals of VECMs has not 
yet been studied for finite samples. 
 
Phillips (1998) criticised using levels VARs in the presence of some unit roots or 
some near unit roots in  order to derive impulse responses.  Many macroeconomic 
variables are well described by unit root processes so this criticism should be taken 
                                          
 
5 See for example Cushman and Zha (1997).   
 
6 An often-cited example here is the paper by Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
 
7 See for example Garratt et al (2001) who discuss details of the requirements to achieve identification 
of shocks by means of long run cointegrating restrictions.   5 
seriously.  Phillips showed that long run impulse response estimates are inconsistent 
in unrestricted (nonstationary) levels VARs.  On the other hand, reduced rank 
regressions in VECMs produce consistent impulse responses.8  Phillips demonstrated 
for finite samples with the Monte Carlo method that the error-correction-based 
impulse responses are highly accurate, whereas levels VARs can produce very poorly 
estimated paths.   
 
In this paper, we first analyse the time series properties of each variable involved in 
order to determine the order of integration.  Next, we set up a VECM to account for 
unit roots and cointegration.  We use Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood-based 
method as a first step in estimating the number of cointegrating vectors, which is 
asymptotically equivalent to reduced rank regression.  Then, we compute impulse 
response functions from the VECM residuals, applying a standard Choleski 
decomposition. 
 
2.2  Data 
 
We use quarterly data from March 1987 to December 2001.  Both the availability of 
data and occurrence of economic reforms in Australia and New Zealand during the 
1980s have influenced our choice of sample period.  Details on data construction are 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
We examine a number of macroeconomic variables for each economy.  We 
endeavoured to select comparable time series from each country.  This was assessed 
with regard to what the series measured and with regard to their time series properties.  
The aim is to ensure the comparability of the models for Australia and New Zealand.   
 
There is serious reason to question the findings of time series studies that do not 
properly account for unit roots in the data.  Failing to account for the presence of unit 
roots can lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates and result in wrong inferences 
being drawn.  We begin our analysis by examining the order of integration. 
 
We examine our data using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron 
test.   The findings of our tests are presented in Appendix A.  We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of one unit root for each of our series that we use in the VECMs, 
whereas the null hypothesis of two unit roots is rejected.  All of the series included in 








3  Examination of the New Zealand and Australian economies when independent 
monetary policies operate  
 
                                          
8 See also Mills (1998) for a survey on modelling non-stationary VARs.   6 
3.1  Model specification 
 
We estimate separate VECM models for each economy and examine their properties.  
In determining the specifications of each model, a trade-off is necessary.  We must 
balance the inclusion of all theoretically relevant variables with the development of a 
parsimonious model given our limited sample size. 
 
All of the models we estimate include real GDP, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the 
90-day interest rate and the Trade Weighted Index (TWI) as endogenous variables. 
We note a conceptual difficulty with our measure of consumer prices in New Zealand 
(NZ).  From March 1999 onwards, the CPI, as measured by Statistics New Zealand, 
excludes interest costs and is denoted CPII.  Hence, the CPI series may contain a 
discontinuity.  In New Zealand, the CPI is I(1) for the period from March 1987 to 
December 2001, while the CPI excluding interest rates (CPII) is I(0).  In most of the 
New Zealand models estimated, we have made use of the CPI.  We note that the 
residuals from these models are normally distributed and stationary.  While we will 
focus on the findings for these models, we will briefly discuss our findings using the 
CPII.  For the Australian economy we consider the use of both the CPI and the CPI 
excluding interest rates, CPII. 
 
We also examine whether holdings of liquid assets are an important channel for the 
transmission of monetary policy.  We accomplish this by examining models that 
include the M1 money aggregate against ones that do not.   
 
We explicitly account for unit roots and cointegration in our data by setting up a 
VECM.  The cointegration rank is determined from the data.  Cointegration imposes a 
long run “equilibrium” relation on the variables.  A VECM imposes on the short run 
dynamics the long run relations that stem from cointegration.  The literature on 
forecasting has documented that accounting for unit roots and cointegration provides 
important information that can dramatically improve forecasting performance over 
specifications that ignore unit roots and cointegration.9  We would expect the same 
improvements for impulse response analyses.  Furthermore, the Monte Carlo results 
of Phillips (1998) have shown that levels VAR specifications instead of VECMs can 
produce poorly estimated impulse response paths in finite samples. 
 
In order to identify the short run effects of monetary policy shocks on the levels of the 
endogenous variables in the VECM, we use a standard Choleski decomposition.  The 
Choleski decomposition we use to generate impulse responses depends crucially on 
the ordering of the variables in the system.  We adopt the following ordering of 
endogenous variables in each of our models, which is fairly standard in the recent 
empirical literature on the Euro-area: Real GDP, the CPI,
10 the 90-day interest rates, 
the TWI, and the M1 money supply.
11  This ordering reflects our priors regarding the 
operation of monetary policy transmission mechanisms.  It assumes that interest rates 
are responsive to contemporaneous changes in real GDP or the CPI, but not vice versa.  
                                          
9 See Christoffersen and Diebold (1998) on theoretical issues, and Anderson, Hoffman and Rasche 
(1998) for an example of the performance of VECMs for forecasting the US economy. 
 
10 T he CPI excluding interest rates replaces the CPI in certain models. 
 
11 The M1 money supply variable is only included in certain models.   7 
It also allows contemporaneous changes in the interest rate to influence the TWI and 
holdings of liquid assets.
12  Clements at al (2001) suggest that such an ordering allows 
for the interest rate equation in a VAR to be interpreted as a monetary policy reaction 
function.  The interest rate does not react contemporaneously to TWI changes.  This 
assumes that the central bank does not adjust interest rates in response to short run 
fluctuations in exchange rates but rather in response to long run “trends” as captured 
by the effect of lags of the TWI that do enter our policy reaction function. 
 
Several potential combinations of lag lengths and exogenous variables were 
considered for each country.  We utilised the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC) when specifying our models and in addition checked that the residuals from 
our VECMs were white noise applying a Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation.  
We also consider whether each specification generates sensible impulse responses. 
 
The potential exogenous variables we examined are the US 90-day interest rate, real 
US GDP and two commodity price indices.13  The commodity price indices that we 
considered were the CRB commodity price index and the Economist Price index.  The 
inclusion of such indices aims to avoid the occurrence of “price puzzles” following 
monetary policy shocks. However, the price puzzle still exist in some of the models. 
Again all variables, except for interest rates, are measured in log-levels.  All of the 
exogenous variables are transformed using first differences so that they enter the 
VECM in stationary form. 
 
Holdings of liquid assets may play a much larger role in the transmission of monetary 
policy in New Zealand than in Australia.  When liquid assets are excluded from the 
model of the New Zealand economy or included as an exogenous variable, the 
resulting impulse responses are not sensible.
14  In the Australian model, the inclusion 
of liquid assets as an endogenous variable generates impulse responses that are not 
sensible.  Including liquid assets as an exogenous variable has  little effect on this 
model.  Given these findings, we include the M1 money aggregate only in the model 
of the New Zealand economy.  It is included as an endogenous variable. We note that 
this introduces differences between the models for New Zealand and Australia that we 
estimate.  This complicates any comparison of the two countries. 
Models of the Australian economy estimated using either the CPI or the CPI 
excluding interest rates have similar SBIC criteria.  However, those models that 
include the CPI generate problematic impulse responses, which is another expression 
of the fragility of applying this type of analysis to Australian and New Zealand data.   
We opt to use the CPI excluding interest rates in our models of the Australian 
economy.  This creates same difficulties when comparing the models of the two 
                                          
 
12 We note that in New Zealand the implementation of monetary policy has changed from a previous 
approach where the Reserve Bank of NZ controlled the money supply to the current approach where 
the RBNZ influences the economy by setting the interest rate on its liabilities and relying on arbitrage 
to transmit this to the economy.  The former approach would suggest an ordering of endogenous 
variables where the money supply proceeds the interest rate.  We examined this ordering and found that 
our results were robust to such a change. 
13 The exogenous variables enter our VECMs with loading factors restricted to zero, as in Wickens and 
Motto (2001). 
 
14 When the M1 money aggregate is included as an exogenous variable, it is differenced to ensure that 
it is stationary.   8 
economies, as the CPI measures used in each model are conceptually different.  This 
complicates the examination of how each economy responds to monetary policy 
shocks and how such shocks are transmitted to the price level. 
 
The inclusion of exogenous variables in our model aims to account for wider trends in 
the world economy that may influence the observed movement in our endogenous 
variables.  Our examination indicates that both economies respond to  the 
contemporaneous US 90-day interest rate.  Trends in US GDP also affect both 
economies, however they tend to be more persistent in Australia.15  Hence in addition 
to the US 90-day rate, the model of the Australian economy includes the lag of US 
real GDP.16  The New Zealand model includes the US 90-day interest rate and the 
contemporaneous value of US real GDP. 
 
Our findings do not support the inclusion of commodity price indices as exogenous 
variables in the model of either economy.  When commodity price i ndices are 
included in our models, the price puzzle is still persistent. Each of our VECMs 
contains 4 lags of each endogenous variable.  This is a specification based on SBIC.  


















VECM descriptions  
                                          
15 When only the contemporaneous values of US real GDP are included, the residuals from the model 
of the Australian economy are serially correlated.  No significant autocorrelation is present when either 
the lag of US real GDP or both the contemporaneous and first lag of US real GDP are included in the 
Australian model.   
 
16 In specifying the model of the Australian economy, we compared a model that included both the 
contemporaneous and the first lag of US real GDP as exogenous variables to one that only included 
lagged US real GDP.  (The models were the same in terms of the other variables they included.)  The 
impulse responses generated by the two models are almost identical.  However, when both 
contemporaneous and lagged US real GDP are included, the results of our cointegration tests were 
borderline cases at the 5% level.  In order to ensure that we develop a parsimonious model that is also 
comparable to the model of the New Zealand economy, we opt to include only the lagged value of US 




We proceed to test for no co-integration among our series.  This is accomplished 
using Johansen’s maximum likelihood-based method.  We examine both trace and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics.  As we include exogenous variables in our 
specifications, we use the modified critical values calculated according to a 
programme described in MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999).  We allow for the 
presence of an intercept but not for deterministic trends in the co-integrating equations.  
We reject the presence of no cointegrating (CE) vectors among our variables.
17, 18  We 
fail to reject the hypothesis of at most  one cointegrating vector  in each model for 
New Zealand and Australia.  The results of our cointegration tests are presented in 
















Co-integration tests for the Australian economy model 
 
                                          
 
 
17  The trace statistic does not reject the presence of no cointegrating vectors among our variables at the 
5 per cent level for Australia.  However, at this significance level the result is a boarder line case.  The 
presence of no co-integrating vectors is rejected at the 10 per cent level.   
 
18  The maximum eigenvalue statistic does not reject the presence of no cointegrating vectors among 
our variables at the 5 per cent level for New Zealand.  However, at this significance level the result is a 
boarder line case.  The presence of no co-integrating vectors is rejected at the 10 per cent level.   
 
New Zealand 
Variable  Abbreviation  Variable  Abbreviation 
Endogenous variables  Real GDP  NZ_LGDP  Real GDP  AU_LGDP 
(Four lags of each   CPI  NZ_LCPI  CPII  AU_LCPII 
endogenous variable are   90-day interest rates  NZ_INT  90-day interest rates  AU_INT 
included in each model)  TWI  NZ_LTWI  TWI  AU_LTWI 
M1 Money Aggregate  NZ_LM1SA 
Exogenous variables  US real GDP  D(US_LGDP)  US real GDP (First lag)  D(US_LGDP(-1)) 




Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent Accept/
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Reject H0
None 67.2518 68.97 Accept
At most 1  30.5768 46.99 Accept
At most 2 12.7538 28.88 Accept
At most 3 1.2074 14.39 Accept
Maximum eigenvalue statistic findings
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent Accept/
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Reject H0
None 36.6750 34.49 Reject









































Given these findings, we estimate VECMs with one co-integrating vector for each 
economy.  This forces the long run relationship between variables onto the short run  
dynamics of the VECM.  This also permits for effects of past disequilibria in the 
dynamic behaviour of our variables. 
 
Trace statistic findings
Hypothesised Trace 5 Percent Accept/
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Reject H0
None 104.8216 94.89 Reject
At most 1  65.1224 68.97 Accept
At most 2 34.4770 46.99 Accept
At most 3 13.3721 28.88 Accept
At most 4 0.8795 14.39 Accept
Maximum eigenvalue statistic findings
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent Accept/
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Reject H0
None 39.6993 40.75 Accept*
At most 1  30.6454 34.49 Accept
At most 2 21.1049 28.11 Accept
At most 3 12.4925 21.52 Accept
At most 4 0.8795 14.39 Accept
Notes: The Maximum eigenvalue statistic rejects the
presence of no co-integrating vectors at the 
10% significance level.  11 
We estimate our models of each economy without imposing any restrictions on the 
cointegrating vector.  Cointegration ties the variables together in the long run and they 
cannot move apart too far over time.  The findings from our regressions are presented 
in Appendix B, tables B1 for Australia and in table B2 for New Zealand.  Lagrange 
multiplier tests indicate that both our models are free from significant autocorrelation. 
 
3.2  Impulse responses for monetary policy shocks 
 
We examine the similarity of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in each 
economy when they operate independent monetary policies and face flexible 
exchange rates. We examine the effect of an exogenously imposed monetary policy 
shock reflecting a 100 basis point shock to the 90-day interest rate in each economy.  
This is accomplished using impulse response functions with a standard Choleski 
decomposition and the variable ordering discussed in section 3.1.  A 40-quarter 
horizon is considered.  Figure 3.1 presents the impulse responses for both economies.  
The impulse responses for New Zealand are slightly more volatile than those for 
Australia, though it should be remembered that there are slight differences to the 
model specifications and thus comparisons should not necessarily be accepted at face 
value.   
   12 
Figure 3.1  
Impulse responses for the Australian and New Zealand economies 
 
Impulse responses for 90 day interest rates  Impulse responses  




























With the caveats mentioned above, we observe some similarities in the response of 
each country to a monetary policy shock.  The effect of the monetary policy shock to 
interest rates persists in both economies for approximately 10 quarters.  Interest rates 
follow a similar path in both countries.   
 
Consistent with our priors, the TWI in both countries responds immediately to the 
monetary policy shock.  In Australia, the TWI increases sharply.  It then briefly (and 
somewhat unexpectedly) declines before increasing again and eventually settling after 
approximately 30 quarters.  In New Zealand, the TWI increases following the 
monetary policy shock, however, in contrast to the Australian model, the effect seems 
to be persistent.  This is unexpected as we would not expect a temporary increase in 




















































































































I  13 
slightly more quickly than its New Zealand counterpart.  This unexpected finding in 
the New Zealand model may reflect the differing nature of the variables included in 
this model relative to those included in the Australian model. 
 
M1 holdings in New Zealand decline sharply after 3 quarters and settle at a new level 
after approximately 20 quarters.  The new level of M1 holdings is approximately 3.5 
per cent lower.   
 
GDP growth in both nations responds quite rapidly, only one quarter after the 
monetary policy shock occurs.  The speed of this response is faster than we would 
have expected.  In both economies the negative effect of the shock peaks after 
approximately 8 quarters.  GDP growth slows by slightly more in New Zealand than 
in Australia. In Australia, GDP growth slows by approximately 0.3 per cent while in 
New Zealand real GDP growth slows by approximately 0.6 per cent.  The effect of the 
shock dissipates in both economies within approximately 20 quarters.  However, the 
size of the GDP response to the same size monetary policy shock appears to be larger 
in New Zealand.   
 
When we examine the effects of a monetary policy shock on the CPI in New Zealand 
we encounter a price puzzle, which is a common finding in the literature and is 
thought to reflect endogenous nature of monetary policy.
19  Monetary policy in New 
Zealand responds to expected inflation.  The observed price puzzle may reflect that 
monetary policy settings are tightened in response observed increases in inflationary 
pressures, which eventuate in higher inflation some quarters later.  It should also be 
noted that the p rice index used in our New Zealand model includes the effects of 
interest rates for most of our sample period.  Our price puzzle findings may therefore 
partly reflect the influence of interest rates on the price index when monetary policy is 
tightened.  The CPI in New Zealand nevertheless begins to decline after 5 quarters, 
which is a plausible policy lag.  The Australian CPI excluding interest declines 
immediately following the monetary policy shock. Australia’s CPII settles at a level 
that is 0.6 per cent lower.  The New Zealand CPI settles at a level that is 0.4 per cent 
lower. 
 
We note that the speed of the adjustment of the variables in both economies is similar 
except for the TWI.  Some differences are observed in the sizes of adjustments.  In 
New Zealand, the observed persistent increase in TWI is unexpected. Potentially this 
apparent difference between the two economies may stem from the measurement 
change that occurred in the New Zealand CPI.  We explore the nature of the 
relationship between our variables using an alternative measure of consumer prices 
that is adjusted for interest rates (CPII).  This measure of consumer prices is 
comparable to that used in the Australian models.  We note that the New Zealand 
measure of the CPII is I(0),  hence its i nclusion in our VECM is conceptually 
problematic.  Despite this complication we proceed to explore the possible use of this 
variable. 
 
                                          
19 Christiano et al (1998) note that focusing on the actions of policy makers may not be a suitable 
method to identify the effects of monetary policy changes, because monetary policy is endogenously 
determined.  An examination of policy changes is likely to reflect not only the effects of the changes, 
but also of the conditions to which policymakers respond.   14 
When the CPII variable is used in the New Zealand model
20 the resulting impulse 
responses are highly problematic, frequently moving in unexpected directions and 
displaying a high level of volatility.  The use of the CPII variable therefore does not 
appear to be appropriate in our analysis.  In the remainder of this paper we shall 
proceed with the CPI variable in the New Zeala nd models.  However, we are aware of 
the less than ideal nature of this variable.   
 
3.3  Models incorporating long run restrictions 
 
We note the presence of anomalies in our models.  Besides the persistent TWI effect 
that is observed in the New Zealand model following a monetary policy shock, 
several of the coefficients in both models have unexpected signs, particularly the 
coefficients on interest rates and GDP.  Further, in some cases we observe economic 
variables responding to monetary policy shocks much faster than might be expected. 
The models presented above assumed that the variables were tied together in the long 
run, but did not use a priori information from economic theory when defining the 
nature of this relationship. 
 
For New Zealand, we explore the results when restrictions are imposed on the 
cointegrating vectors so that they can be given the interpretation of a standard money 
demand function.  Imposing such restrictions requires removal of the TWI from the 
cointegrating vector but still leaving it in the VECM otherwise.  We also consider the 
possibility of imposing further restrictions on the cointegrating vector as implied by a 
standard money demand model that relates real money balances to real GDP and 
nominal interest rates.  These restrictions lead to very similar impulse responses as the 
model without such restrictions.  We observe that the persistent increase in the TWI is 
still present when a monetary policy shock occurs.  Also, the signs on the coefficients 
are similar to those from the unrestricted model.  Further, the coefficient estimates for 
money demand that we obtained for the restricted cointegrating vectors did not all 
have the correct sign.  We therefore do not report results for these cases.  The 
unrestricted coefficient estimates for the cointegrating vector above can still be given 
an interpretation within a money demand framework that considers currency 
substitution.  However, our primary aim is to develop a model for impulse responses 
and not for money demand. 
 
For Australia, the determination of appropriate restrictions is more problematic.  As 
noted above, the Australian model does not include money as an endogenous variable.  
The models with money included tended not to perform well, even when long run 
restrictions were imposed.  Consequently we do not develop a restricted Australian 
model.  
 
3.4   Implications for currency union 
Differences in transmission mechanisms may be costly to smaller economies within a 
currency union whose macroeconomic conditions are likely to have less influence on 
                                          
 
20 We note that the inclusion of an I(0) in our model is conceptually inappropriate.  However, some 
uncertainty exists regarding the order of integration of CPII in New Zealand.  Our use of this variable is 
done as robustness check on our findings.   15 
the setting of common monetary policy.
21   Our examination of transmission 
mechanisms suggests that New Zealand and Australia display both differences and 
similarities in their respective transmission mechanisms.  Importantly, GDP and the 
CPI in the two economies respond to identical monetary policy shocks with a similar 
speed and movement, albeit with different size of the effects. 
 
One notable difference is the TWI adjustment, which shows larger swings in New 
Zealand than in Australia, indicating that this channel plays a larger role in the 
transmission of monetary policy in New Zealand.  This finding is consistent with the 
suggestions of McCaw and McDermott (2000).  However, entry into a currency union 
involves the loss of an independent exchange rate for both economies.  This is likely 
to be more costly for New Zealand.  By virtue of its larger size, economic conditions 
in the Australian economy are likely to have more bearing on the exchange rate under 
a common currency.  This would reduce the responsiveness of what is an important 
adjustment mechanism for New Zealand, placing greater strain on other channels 
when monetary policy changes occur. 
 
 
4  Conclusion 
Monetary policy transmission mechanisms play a significant role in the operation of 
economies.  Differences in transmission mechanisms can generate asymmetric 
behaviour between currency union partners, even when they experience the same 
monetary policy shock.  This has the potential to widen existing cyclical variation 
between currency union partners.  Small economies, such as New Zealand, are likely 
to have limited influence on monetary policy under any joint currency arrangement.  
Hence, they may face a monetary policy that is determined by union wide economic 
conditions, but which is not suited to their own conditions.  For such economies, the 
similarity of transmission mechanisms in the economies of prospective currency 
union partners is an important concern. 
 
Our analysis from individual country models provides qualified evidence  that the 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms of New Zealand and Australia are similar 
in many respects, especially in terms of the speed and the nature of the adjustment 
that occurs to the CPI and GDP in response to monetary policy shocks.  However, the 
sizes of GDP and exchange rate responses seem different between the two countries.  
Whether these results would persist under a currency union is an open question. 
Therefore, further research, particularly into the nature of business cycle 
harmonisation  under a union, is still necessary as was argued by Frankel and Rose 
(1998). 
 
The results we obtained in this paper are only tentative, and sensitive to the definition 
of the variables and the sample period examined.  Further, while our results seem 
fairly  intuitive, some anomalies are evident.  In particular, when we examined the 
operation of monetary policy in NZ we encountered difficulties modelling the speed 
with which economic variables respond to monetary policy and more general 
                                          
21 See Clements et al 2001.   16 
difficulties modelling  movements in exchange rates.  We suspect that these 
weaknesses reflect data limitations.  New Zealand data is especially problematic due 
to the numerous structural changes that have occurred since the early 1980s and 
changes in the measurement of CPI.  As a result, we had to use a shorter sample 
period than we would have preferred. This reduces the robustness of our conclusions. 
Nevertheless, the results may provide insights into transmission mechanisms at work 
by applying new techniques to what data is available.  
 
Examining the transmission mechanisms under a hypothetical currency-union model 
can be one of the directions for future research.   17 
Appendix A 
 
Description and properties of Australian and New Zealand data 
 
The variables we examined are: 
 
au_int, nz_int:   Our chosen measure of interest rates in both Australia 
(au) and New Zealand (nz) is the 90-day interest rate on 
bank accepted bills.   
 
au_lgdp, nz_ldgp:   The natural log of real GDP in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
 
au_lcpi, nz_lcpi:   The natural log of the Consumer Price Index.   
 
au_lcpii, nz_lcpii:   The natural log of the Consumer Price Index excluding 
interest rate effects. 
 
au_ltwi, nz_ltwi:  The natural log of the Trade Weighted Index. 
 
au_lcre, nz_lcre:   For Australia this series reflects loans and advances by 
financial intermediaries plus total bank bills 
outstanding.
22  In New Zealand private sector credit is 
the sum of the Reserve Bank and M3 institutions' New 
Zealand dollar claims on the private sector, excluding 
inter-institutional claims. 
 
au_lm1sa, nz_ lm1sa:  The natural log of the M1 money aggregate, using 
seasonally adjusted data.  M1 includes notes and coins 
held by the public plus chequeable deposits, minus inter-
institutional chequeable deposits, and minus central 
government deposits. 
 
The real GDP and the CPI series are available quarterly.  However the other series we 
use are in monthly form.  We transform these series using three month averages to 
obtain quarterly series.   
 
The results of our unit root tests are given in tables A.1 and A.2 below.  We used the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test.  To determine 
the number of lagged differences to include in the ADF test regression, we use 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC).  The PP test for unit roots corrects for possible 
autocorrelation by means of a Bartlett kernel instead of lag augmentations.  The 
bandwidth is selected automatically as proposed by Newey and West (1994).  The 
ADF test has relatively better size properties than other unit root tests, whereas the PP 
test dominates in terms of test power.  Our results indicate that all our series, except 
for the credit variable in Australia, are well described by an integrated process of 
order one over our sample period.  This holds across both tests.   
 
                                          
22 Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin (March 2001) p S89.   18 
Our findings for the credit series for Australia are not conclusive.  We initially 
examined this series using a three-month average of seasonally adjusted data.  The 
ADF test indicates that this series is stationary however the PP test indicates that it is 
integrated of an order greater than one.  The alternative definitions of the credit series 
that we considered were non-seasonally adjusted three-month averages and monthly 
estimates of credit using both seasonally adjusted and non-seasonally adjusted d ata.
23  
The use of these alternative definitions does not affect the findings regarding the order 
of integration of this series. 
 
Holdings of liquid assets are highly correlated with the use of private sector credit.  
We explore the use of a proxy for private sector credit holdings.  We measure 
holdings of liquid assets with the M1 money aggregate.  This aggregate includes 
holdings of notes and coins by the public and funds held in transaction accounts.  
These series are I(1) in both New Zealand and Australia.  Given these findings, we 
use holdings of liquid assets as a proxy for private sector credit. 
 
Table A.1  




























Table A.2  




23 For January, April, July and October. 
Null of one unit root Null of two unit roots
Variable Case AIC PP AIC PP
Order of 
integration
Interest 2 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
GDP 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
CPI 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
CPI (excluding 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
interest rates)
Exchange rate 2 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
Credit 3 Reject Accept - Accept Indeterminate
 M1 (SA) 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
Note: A 5% rejection level is used. Case 2 includes a constant only in the test
regression and case 3 includes a constant and a deterministic time trend  
in the test regression.  19 
Unit root tests for New Zealand for the period 1987Q1 to 2001Q3 
 
 
  Null of one unit root Null of two unit roots
Variable Case AIC PP AIC PP
Order of 
integration
Interest 2 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
GDP 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
CPI 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
CPI (excluding 3 Reject Reject - - I(0)
interest rates)
Exchange rate 2 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
Credit 3 Accept Accept Reject Reject I(1)
 M1 (SA) 3 Accept Accept Accept * Reject I(1)
Note: A 5% rejection level is used.  For the definitions of case 2 and 3 see the above notes. 
















Table B2 VECM for New Zealand 











Sample(adjusted): 1988:2 2001:3 
Included observations: 54 after adjusting endpoints 
Cointegrating Eq:   Coefficients 
AU_LGDP(-1)  1.000000 
AU_LCPII(-1)  -1.862198 
AU_INT(-1)  -0.024555 
AU_LTWI(-1)  -0.207917 
C  -1.885612 
Error Correction  Coefficients 
D(AU_LGDP)  D(AU_LCPI)  D(AU_INT)  D(AU_LTWI) 
CointEq1  0.042751 ***  0.059345  *  8.235224  *  0.026851 
D(AU_LGDP(-1))  -0.086400  -0.240921  9.667965  2.236722 * 
D(AU_LGDP(-2))  -0.125971  -0.197738  7.910499  -1.087416 
D(AU_LGDP(-3))  -0.160708  0.168053  0.957419  0.892649 
D(AU_LGDP(-4))  -0.121394  -0.128078  4.515757  0.452772 
D(AU_LCPII(-1))  -0.148640  -0.145081  6.390525  0.470025 
D(AU_LCPII(-2))  -0.123771  0.087514  6.675449  0.537584 
D(AU_LCPII(-3))  -0.341338 ***  0.014698  10.428160  0.874872 
D(AU_LCPII(-4))  0.336298 ***  0.392935 ***  -10.494150  1.340763 
D(AU_INT(-1))  0.002954  -0.000277  0.277680 ***  -0.018191 *** 
D(AU_INT(-2))  -0.001229  0.002208  0.001870  -0.010588 
D(AU_INT(-3))  -0.001511  0.000893  0.108587  0.018370 *** 
D(AU_INT(-4))  0.004719  *  0.002555  -0.008435  -0.008621 
D(AU_LTWI(-1))  -0.071084 **  0.023948  1.579720  0.104856 
D(AU_LTWI(-2))  0.056065 **  -0.023218  4.076765 ***  -0.099816 
D(AU_LTWI(-3))  -0.030636  0.028428  4.328503 ***  -0.111252 
D(AU_LTWI(-4))  0.044216 ***  -0.004600  2.809653  0.106123 
C  0.012396  *  0.013383  *  -0.373073  -0.053648 * 
D(US_LGDP(-1))  0.436345  *  -0.461598  *  1.854403  0.234148 
D(US_INT)  0.002565  -0.002097  -0.232023  0.032634 * 
Notes: Asterisks indicate the significant with which the null hypothesis:  b   = 0 can be rejected 
*  = Significant at the 1% level 
**  = Significant at the 5% level 
***  = Significant at the 10% level   21 
Table 3.2 




















 Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 2001:3
 Included observations: 49 after adjusting endpoints








D(NZ_LGDP) D(NZ_LCPI) D(NZ_INT) D(NZ_LTWI) D(NZ_LM1SA)
CointEq1 0.130799 *** 0.010682 7.032436 *** -0.081421 0.135427
D(NZ_LGDP(-1)) -0.496811 *** -0.015535 -16.145470 0.752701 0.714945
D(NZ_LGDP(-2)) -0.293871 * 0.011447 -35.908750 *** 1.372401 ** 0.471191
D(NZ_LGDP(-3)) -0.515906 *** 0.113696 15.138280 0.457971 -0.829618
D(NZ_LGDP(-4)) -0.575501 *** -0.074878 -10.045340 0.090545 -0.173939
D(NZ_LCPI(-1)) -0.321318 0.049803 45.547550 * 0.594185 -1.041717
D(NZ_LCPI(-2)) 0.407790 -0.020618 -1.242486 0.803699 1.606125 *
D(NZ_LCPI(-3)) -0.309486 0.337397 *** 2.654500 0.597473 1.574420
D(NZ_LCPI(-4)) -0.144064 0.288135 ** 18.153200 0.408844 0.772086
D(NZ_INT(-1)) 0.002708 0.004308 *** 0.551795 *** 0.004115 0.010446
D(NZ_INT(-2)) 0.004507 ** -0.000026 -0.334530 * -0.005667 -0.012066
D(NZ_INT(-3)) 0.003543 * 0.000319 0.267394 0.004642 0.004784
D(NZ_INT(-4)) 0.002972 -0.001451 * -0.146510 -0.001351 -0.004673
D(NZ_LTWI(-1)) 0.114212 ** 0.006074 1.498525 0.194855 -0.105770
D(NZ_LTWI(-2)) 0.160706 *** -0.027285 2.994259 -0.236830 0.187777
D(NZ_LTWI(-3)) 0.108221 * 0.014286 1.333940 -0.055324 -0.060616
D(NZ_LTWI(-4)) 0.004749 -0.025263 10.920140 * -0.198387 -0.285575
D(NZ_LM1SA(-1)) -0.105493 * -0.007376 4.134050 0.095420 -0.045694
D(NZ_LM1SA(-2)) -0.055194 -0.051054 * -2.658225 -0.242416 -0.078413
D(NZ_LM1SA(-3)) -0.109389 * 0.025896 -3.884690 -0.291816 0.283734
D(NZ_LM1SA(-4)) -0.034495 0.000756 -1.334937 -0.091376 -0.142403
C 0.034475 *** 0.002368 0.026057 -0.028501 -0.021965
D(US_LGDP) -0.660210 * -0.051499 -6.747519 0.354854 2.529867 **
D(US_INT) 0.009782 *** 0.001515 0.308320 0.005509 0.004003
Notes: Asterisks indicate the significant with which the null hypothesis: b = 0 can be rejected
*  = Significant at the 5% level
**  = Significant at the 1% level
***  = Significant at the 10% level  22 
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